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At dusk on Friday 9 September 1513, the bodies of 12,000 Scots lay dead around Flodden Field in Northumberland.
Standing beside the solemn, unostentatious stone monument that marks the site of the battle today, one has to make a conscious effort to conjure up a picture of the carnage that was spread across this countryside as the
result of one day's fighting. In many ways Flodden was a watershed among battles. It brought an army, led by a king who was inspired more by outdated medieval notions of chivalry than by a sound appreciation of tactics,
face to face with one led by a hard nosed, professional commander. An ill coordinated Scottish host, taking part in a season s campaign in the spirit of boisterous football supporters, was arrayed against a well drilled
and well armed English army of only half their number, but infinitely better prepared to fight with the tough skills demanded by modern warfare. The origins of the battle lie in the international power politics of the
day. The great European powers - England, France, Spain and the papacy - had their own political objectives. England in particular was often embroiled in wars with France. On the chequerboard of alliances, invasions and
treaties, Scotland was not very prominent. I let location on Europe's periphery may have seemed to marginalise her importance, yet it was this very fact that gave Scotland a strategic status out of all proportions to
her military capabilities. A hostile Scotland was a potential distraction to England in her wars with the French. War on two fronts was always the English nightmare. For James IV of Scotland the conflict
uttered a chance not only to demonstrate Scotland's importance in Europe, but also to indulge in his own notions of regal chivalry. Two factors made his position ambiguous. On the one hand he was brother-in-law to the
English king Henry VII. through his marriage to Margaret Tudor. On the other hand he had signed a treaty of joint support against England with Louis XII of Lance. When Louis's queen (no doubt acting on political
prompting) sent a plea to James in which she described an innocent France threatened with invasion by brutal England, James's innate chivalry led him to stage an invasion of the north of England. It was a military
adventure from which Scotland could not expect to derive any great advantage. Henry VIII was fully prepared for the Scottish attack. He had confidently entrusted his northern command to Thomas Howard, earl of Surrey,
who was a highly experienced lieutenant-general. Henry made sure that his own departure with the main army to France did not denude his military resources in the northern counties. On 26 July 1513 James sent an envoy to
Henry, giving due notice of his intention to invade Northumberland. On 1 August Surrey set up his command at Pontefract in Yorkshire. Two weeks later, James assembled half his army in Edinburgh and the other half in
Duns in Berwickshire. On 22 August the Scottish army crossed the Tweed and encamped on English soil. At this juncture the whole Scottish strategy seemed loaded with impending doom. The war-aims were vague -
simply to mill around in the north of England creating a disturbance, but with no clear-cut strategic targets. James's status as a field commander was that of a talented amateur. The Scots ranks were led by a mixture of
hereditary family chiefs and filled with a motley collection of feudal tenants, farm workers and townsfolk with no large scale battle experience. The Scots relied on heavy fortress guns laboriously hauled across
country, in contrast to the lighter field artillery of the English. They used old- fashioned 18 ft pikes in hedgehog-like formations called 'schiltrons' - solid bodies of men, with spears arrayed outwards. The English
were armed for greater mobility with 8 ft 'bills' (axe-headed spears) and longbows. James's first action was to lay siege to Norham Castle on the Tweed. This occupied the Scots for one week before the castle's
surrender on 29 August. Three days later the Scots captured the nearby Etal Castle, then camped around that village for a further four days. The weather was dreadful and many Scots quietly drifted back home. On 3
September Surrey's army assembled some 12 miles away at Alnwick and on the following day Surrey received the crucial addition to his forces of over 1000 professional soldiers from the English fleet (led by his son, the
Lord Admiral of England). Surrey's immediate concern was to bring the Scots to battle before they decided to call it a day and return to Scotland. There then occurred the most extraordinary feature of the
battle the 'challenge' sent by Surrey to James. The English commander knew that if there was one thing that would hold the Scottish king to his ground it would be an appeal to his sense of honour. On 7 September both
armies prepared their positions. Surrey moved his forces to Wooler and Millfield, where the land offered a good killing ground for his field artillery and cavalry. James, now four miles away, made the surprise (and to
some minds unchivalrous) move of taking his army to the top of Flodden Hill, thus assuming a position of apparently impregnable advantage. Undoubtedly James chose well: Flodden Hill (or Ridge) is about 500ft high and
fairly steep sided to the north and east. The rear is protected by even higher hills and in front, facing the direction of the expected English attack, was a marsh intersected by the Palms burn and the river Till. Only
from the east could the English consider attacking this natural fortress. Today the area is covered with well-planted agricultural land, scattered woods and the hamlet cottages of Branxton. In 1513 the land was empty,
windswept and bleak, the bare contours of the land only accentuating the strength of the Scottish position.  |
