Despite having endured so many years of ill fortune, the Jacobite cause was still powerful enough to be considered the greatest threat to Britain
in mid-century. In 1723, an English newspaper had argued that the people of the Scottish Highlands "will never fail to join with foreign Popish powers, to advance the interests they have espoused; so they always
have been, and infallibly will be instruments and tools in the hands of those who have a design to enslave or embroil the British nation. Notwithstanding the pains taken. . . to disarm them, they are still well armed by
supplies from abroad, sent them on purpose ... to encourage and support foreign invasions, which it is not possible to prevent by any naval power, because of the wildness of their country, and the many convenient
harbors and landing places that are on their coasts."As if to fulfill this prophesy, Charles Edward seized his opportunity. At a time when George II was away in Hanover and the bulk of the British Army was
fighting in Flanders and Germany, the Stuart prince landed in the Hebrides in July 1745. He was encouraged by promise of support from France, and indeed some ships did reach Scotland with supplies and artillery. By
September, Charles had rallied thousands of Highlanders. Aided by the Provost's who secretly left a gate open, they had taken the city of Edinburgh (where he assured the Presbyterian clergy of religious toleration),
captured Carlisle and defeated a small British force at Prestonpans where his soldiers employed their broadswords in the famous Highland charge.
Flushed with victory over the obviously ill-trained and ill-prepared
British force of General Cope, the Scottish army marched south to England, hoping to rally support all along the way. At Manchester, the Prince informed them that the French would invade on 9 December. Encouraged, they
continued their march to London, the capture of which was essential to their cause. They reached as far as Derby in the Midlands. Notwithstanding the success of the Highland charge at Prestonpans, it was generally
recognized by the more practical Jacobite commanders that their only real chance of victory lay with the securing of substantial military aid from abroad. In future engagements, the Highlanders were going to have face a
disciplined army whose officers and men had been tested time and time again on European battlefields. It was also understood that, in times of peace, foreign governments were unlikely to launch a massive invasion of
Britain on behalf of the Stuarts.
The Duke of Cumberland, George II's youngest son was Commander-in-chief of British forces on the continent. Whenever necessary, he was prepared to send troops to England immediately.
In September, he sent ten of his best battalions, supported by a contingent of Dutch troops. England then undertook emergency measures to counter the threat from Charles Edward; those who refused to take the Oaths of
Allegiance and Supremacy and the Test Act Declaration had their arms and horses confiscated. The Lords Lieutenant of the various counties were instructed to raise troops for the defense of the realm.
As the Jacobite
army marched southward through England, it became apparent that Charles Edward was not going to be successful in raising the men and money necessary to sustain the invasion. Even in the Scottish Lowlands, support had
not been forthcoming. Interests of commerce overrode those of patriotism. Even at Derby, where they were received favorably, the Jacobite army managed to gain only three recruits. In addition, fear of a return to a
Catholic monarchy was allied to a general indifference. On a number of occasions, without success, English Jacobites had urged the conversion of James or Charles to Anglicanism. We can only speculate as to the support
he would have received in a country ruled by a unpopular German-speaking king had he done so.
The astute Dr. Johnson, no lover of Scotland, but who was not too fond of the Hanoverian dynasty either, commented that
"If England were fairly polled, the present king would be sent away to-night." He then added that the English people "would not risk anything to restore the exiled family. They would not give twenty
shillings of a piece to bring it about." On their way south, the Jacobites perceived that the counties through which their armies passed seemed to contain many more enemies than friends, a perception that decided a
retreat from Derby rather than an advance to London. In response to the invasion, the Government undertook a coherent and united military response. The Duke of Cumberland was recalled from the Netherlands and
placed in charge of the army that had been built up in the Midlands. The British army now had what the Jacobites lacked: clear agreement over objectives, a united command and a responsive command structure. Faced with
such odds, along with the fact that continued French dithering had allowed the British navy to control the Channel, the Jacobite cause was lost long before Culloden. Realizing that it had no widespread domestic support
and lacked the necessary substantial foreign aid, on December 5, 1745 the Jacobite Council decided to retreat.
Despite Charles Edward's bold plans to advance on London and thereby undermine the regime, Lord Murray
argued for a return to Scotland. The Prince admitted the lack of support from English Jacobites. The very speed of the advance into England had caught the French by surprise they were still preparing the invasion that
never came about. Misleading reports about the strength of the English forces convinced the majority of the Council to return to Scotland when perhaps further advances may have created panic in the Government, and when
additional successes would have certainly won over the doubters in England and made possible the invasion from France. It was this decision at Derby, much more than the defeat at Culloden that doomed the Jacobite cause
and signaled the end of the '45. Without French help, the forces of Charles Edward had to fight on alone.
An English force that caught up with the rebels was soundly defeated at Clifton, the last battle to be fought
on English soil. Once again, a concentrated Highland charge managed to dislodged British dragoons. Scottish success, however, only strengthened the resolve of the pursuing troops under Cumberland, who was determined to
use his superior firepower and strength of numbers to his advantage the next time. The battle also led to a feeling among the Highlanders that they were invincible in a charge involving hand-to-hand fighting. They were
almost correct. They should have realized that their success at Clifton had only come about because they had so little distance to cover to bring their claymores into action against an enemy unfamiliar with the terrain
in the half-light and unable to bring their superior firepower into effect. On the bumpy, uneven pasture lands of Culloden with a considerable distance to cover under fire before they could reach the ranks of the
English troops, the bravery of the charging Highlanders would not be enough.
The small Scottish garrison left to defend Carlisle to assist Charles Edward's return to England was quickly subdued under the guns of
Cumberland. The Duke opposed any quarter to the defenders. His cruel and savage discipline was in direct contrast to the policy of Prince Charles who frequently intervened mercifully on behalf of civilians. Cumberland's
acts revealed the fear and hatred of the Hanoverian regime and his own uncompromising attitude toward those who he considered enemies of Britain. For the Duke, cruelty was policy. Following the capture of Carlisle, the
Highlanders won a victory at Falkirk, but their lack of discipline and professional soldiership prevented them from completely following up and annihilating the troops of the seasoned veteran General Hawley. In the
battle, the British troops had been driven from the field and the cavalry, severely hampered by the terrain, had been completely unable to handle the Scottish ranks. Because of the defeat, Hawley was replaced by
Cumberland.
Jacobite rejoicing at the victory of Falkirk was premature. As so many times in the past, the opportunity was lost. Once again, in the history of the Celtic peoples of Britain, another brave attempt to
hang on to their lands, their culture and their heritage was ultimately defeated. Failure to take Stirling Castle did nothing to foster Jacobite morale, further weakened by Charles Edward's absence from his troops and
his indecision over attacking Edinburgh. Desertion from the ranks had now also become a serious problem. The men of the clans had business to attend to at home.
It became harder to keep the Scottish army together. Not
only that, but the Highlanders did not compensate for changes in tactics effected in the British army that attached the bayonet to the muzzle, allowing their rifles to be simultaneously fired (thus taking away the
advantages of the Highlanders had enjoyed at Prestonpans and Falkirk). English soldiers were also trained to meet frontal charges by having their bayonets aimed at the opponent to the left, whose raised broadsword would
leave his right side open. It was a tactic hardly used at Culloden.
Much has been written about the killing field of Culloden that took place in April 1745. Any advantages the Highlanders enjoyed in earlier battles
had been won by a fast attack upon a line unable to use its firepower. Culloden was different. It was firepower alone that decided that outcome, well-disciplined firepower against a clearly visible target. The enormous
casualties suffered by the Highlanders in their futile charges against the entrenched infantry and the slaughter of their wounded was followed by a brutal aftermath. The Scottish clans were regarded as nothing more than
barbarians. Their property was plundered by Cumberland's men with the Duke's approval. Punitive expeditions were undertaken to kill as many Jacobites as possible "if not all," and destroy their property.
Systematic killings, rapes and devastation became the norm. Sad to say, many of those who delighted most in the rape of the Highlands were themselves Scots; the Royal Scots Fusiliers had been in the front line of
Cumberland's troops on Culloden Moor.
Bliadna Thearlaich, Charlie's Year to the Gaelic-speaking Highlanders, was finished. The Prince, declining to die at the head of his gallant soldiers, escaped to France
after being spirited away into hiding on Skye with the aid of Flora MacDonald. Despite a huge reward (30,000 pounds) offered for his capture, he was never betrayed. The Jacobites were left without any hope of
reorganizing, though they still hoped for support from the Bourbons in Spain and France. This was not forthcoming. Because of the movement away from the struggles in Europe to those for control of North America, Prince
Charles Edward, left without a purpose, wandered around Europe, drinking heavily.
The no-longer Bonnie Prince died in January 1788, long after his sacred Jacobinism had been exhausted. The butcher who went by the name
Duke of Cumberland was greatly honored for his victory, but also reviled for his treatment of what after all were British subjects. He was later disgraced for his failure to defeat the French armies in the final years
of the War of the Austrian Succession and died in 1765.
